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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-1444 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CHE ROSE, 
                Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 3:10-cr-025) 
District Judge:  Hon. Kim R. Gibson 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 2, 2015 
 
Before:   FISHER, JORDAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  June 3, 2015) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Che Rose appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania denying his motion to suppress the fruits of a search of Brandon 
Grayson’s apartment.  He argues that, as Grayson’s social guest, he had a legitimate 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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expectation of privacy in Grayson’s apartment, and, as a result, he has standing to 
challenge the search.  His argument is unpersuasive and we will affirm.   
I. Background 
A. Factual Background 
On September 10, 2009, Detective Larry Wagner was investigating a recent 
burglary in which a .40 caliber handgun had been stolen.  J.M., a juvenile residing at the 
Cambria County Juvenile Detention Home, told Detective Wagner that another juvenile, 
A.P., claimed to have sold the firearm to an older black man for $300.  J.M. was not 
present when A.P. sold the gun; in fact, J.M. never saw A.P. possess the firearm.  J.M. 
said that the sale took place at an apartment on the top floor of a building located on 
Cypress Avenue in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, across from the old Cypress Avenue 
School.  More specifically, the address was 340 Cypress Avenue, Apartment 6 
(“Apartment 6”).  J.M. knew the location because he had accompanied A.P. to Apartment 
6 after the sale when, for unexplained reasons, A.P. attempted to retrieve the firearm.   
Detective Wagner spoke with other juveniles who corroborated a part of J.M.’s 
information, though they could not confirm the location of the sale.  Detective Wagner 
spoke to A.P., who admitted handling the firearm but did not admit to possessing it for 
any length of time.  A.P. also denied selling the gun to anyone.   
Within hours of interviewing J.M., Detective Wagner decided to go to Apartment 
6.  Because he believed that the matter presented issues of officer safety, he took three 
other officers along: Detective Eckenrod, Officer Britton, and Officer Kabler.  Also, 
because he was concerned about the passage of time and the possibility of the firearm 
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being moved, Detective Wagner did not obtain a search warrant.  Instead, he hoped to 
meet with the occupant, explain the information that he had gathered, and receive consent 
to search the apartment.   
When they arrived at Apartment 6, Officer Kabler walked to the rear of the 
apartment building and Detective Wagner knocked on the front door of Apartment 6.  
Grayson opened the door.  At the time, Grayson, who was renting the apartment, had 
resided there for a little over a year, but he spent most nights at his fiancée’s apartment.  
After spending the night of September 9, 2009, at his fiancée’s apartment, Grayson 
returned to Apartment 6 sometime between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. on the morning of 
September 10 to prepare for a cookout he was hosting that day.  About one hour later, 
Grayson’s brother and his brother’s girlfriend arrived along with her child.  Shortly 
thereafter, others arrived, including Rose.   
Rose was a casual acquaintance of Grayson’s, but he was a good friend of 
Grayson’s brother.  Although Grayson had known Rose for approximately six years, the 
two seldom spent time together.  Rose had stayed the night at Grayson’s residence at least 
once when Grayson lived at a different address, but Rose had never been an overnight 
guest at Apartment 6.     
After Grayson opened his apartment door, Detective Wagner identified himself, 
explained that he was investigating a firearm burglary, and asked for permission to search 
the apartment for the firearm.  Grayson did not consent and told the officers that they 
would need to secure a search warrant if they wished to search his apartment.  Detective 
Wagner responded that he would seek a search warrant, but in the interest of officer 
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safety and to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence, the officers needed to secure 
the apartment.  After receiving that explanation, Grayson stepped out of the way and the 
officers entered Apartment 6.   
At about the same time the officers were entering Grayson’s apartment, Officer 
Kabler, who was behind the apartment building, heard a window being opened.  He 
looked up and saw Rose leaning out of a window with a revolver in his hand.  Officer 
Kabler radioed to the other officers that there was a person with a gun hanging from one 
of the windows of the apartment.  He then ordered Rose to drop the gun, but Rose did not 
comply and instead unsuccessfully attempted to throw the gun onto the roof.  It landed on 
the ground instead.  Detectives Eckenrod and Wagner then entered the room where Rose 
was hanging out of the window.  Without any prompting from the officers, Rose 
proclaimed that the gun was his, nobody else’s, and nobody else was involved.  The 
officers arrested Rose and seized the .38 caliber revolver he had tried to hide, along with 
money and crack cocaine concealed on his person.   
After obtaining a warrant, the police searched Apartment 6 but did not locate the 
stolen .40 caliber firearm for which they had come.   
B. Procedural History 
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Rose with distribution of less than 5 
grams of crack cocaine on June 19, 2009, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 
841(b)(1)(C) (count 1); unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon on September 10, 
2009, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (count 2); possession with intent to distribute 
less than 5 grams of crack cocaine on September 10, 2009, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
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§§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) (count 3); and distribution of less than 5 grams of crack 
cocaine on April 13, 2010, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) (count 
4).   
Rose moved to suppress the evidence that was seized on September 10, 2009, and 
that provided the basis for counts 2 and 3.  In his motion, he argued that his statements 
and the physical evidence were products of a warrantless search of Grayson’s apartment, 
which was made without probable cause or exigent circumstances.  Rose claimed that he 
was an overnight guest at Grayson’s apartment and therefore had standing to challenge 
the legality of the search.  The District Court held a hearing to consider his motion, but 
Rose presented no evidence to support his assertion that he had been an overnight guest.  
The District Court denied the motion, finding that, as a short-term social guest, Rose did 
not have standing to challenge the search of Grayson’s apartment.   
Rose pled guilty to counts 2 and 3, but he reserved the right to appeal the denial of 
his suppression motion, which he has now done.   
II. Discussion1 
To have standing to challenge the search of Grayson’s apartment, Rose must 
establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment.  Minnesota v. 
Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-97 (1990).  That requires him to show both that he had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the apartment and that his expectation was 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  On appeal from the denial of a motion to 
suppress, we review the District Court’s factual findings for clear error and exercise 
plenary review over its legal determinations.  United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114, 118 
(3d Cir. 2014).   
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objectively reasonable.  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 & n.12 (1978); United States 
v. Donahue, 764 F.3d 293, 298-99 (3d Cir. 2014).  As the Supreme Court has explained, 
a person who lacks the requisite expectation of privacy and is “aggrieved by an illegal 
search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a 
search of a third person’s premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment 
rights infringed.”  Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134.   
On appeal, Rose abandons the argument he made in the District Court that he was 
an overnight guest and argues instead that, because he was Grayson’s social guest and 
had a “pre-existing relationship” with Grayson, he should be recognized as having a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in Grayson’s apartment and, consequently, having 
standing to challenge the search of the apartment.  (Opening Br. at 14; see also Opening 
Br. at 27 (“As a social guest present with his host’s permission to enjoy a cook out and to 
hang out, Che Rose had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home of his host and 
long-time acquaintance, Brandon Grayson.”).)  Rose argues that Minnesota v. Olson 
supports his position.  In Olson, the police made a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into 
a house where Robert Olson was an overnight guest and arrested him.  The Supreme 
Court held that the arrest violated Olson’s Fourth Amendment rights.  In reaching its 
conclusion, the Olson Court reasoned that “[s]taying overnight in another’s home is a 
longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by society” and 
“society recognizes that a houseguest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s 
home.”  495 U.S. at 98.  The Supreme Court’s analysis was also informed by its 
observation that an overnight guest “seeks shelter in another’s home precisely because it 
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provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by 
anyone but his host and those his host allows inside.”  Id. at 99.   
Rose contends that the holding in Olson is not limited to overnight guests and that 
the principles articulated in the case are broad enough to cover a social guest attending an 
afternoon cookout at the home of a long-time acquaintance and friend.  In support of that 
contention, Rose reasons that, “despite [Olson’s] emphasis upon the special privacy 
concerns of guests when they are asleep and cannot monitor their own safety or the 
security of their belongings, that consideration seems largely irrelevant in the Olson case 
itself, where the objected-to police conduct occurred at three o’clock in the afternoon.”  
(Opening Br. at 22 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).)  Rose also says that 
“visiting the house of another without an overnight stay is [also] a longstanding social 
custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by society.”  (Id. at 22-23 (emphasis 
and internal quotation marks omitted).)   
Whether or not Fourth Amendment protections may be broad enough to cover 
individuals other than residents and their overnight guests, the expansive rule for which 
Rose advocates goes too far.2  In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) overruled 
on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), the Supreme Court 
held that a defendant who was arrested at his friend’s apartment during the execution of a 
                                              
2 Rose asserts that, looking at the concurrences and dissent filed in Minnesota v. 
Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998), we can surmise that five Justices accept the proposition that 
almost all social guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy, and therefore protection 
against unreasonable searches, when in their host’s home.  (Opening Br. at 26.)  Rose 
makes a clever argument, but we need not engage in the reading of tea leaves given the 
Supreme Court’s clear guidance in Rakas v. Illinois, discussed herein.   
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search warrant could challenge the search of the apartment because he was “legitimately 
on [the] premises.”  Id. at 267.  In Rakas v. Illinois, however, the Supreme Court rejected 
Jones’s “legitimately on [the] premises” standard as overly broad.  439 U.S. at 142-48.  
While Rakas reaffirmed the factual holding in Jones, stating that “Jones on its facts 
merely stands for the unremarkable proposition that a person can have a legally sufficient 
interest in a place other than his own home so that the Fourth Amendment protects him 
from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place,” Rakas recognized that, as an 
overnight guest, Jones was much more than just “legitimately on [the] premises.”  439 
U.S. at 141-42.  Olson later adhered to the reasoning in Rakas, holding that the defendant 
had standing to challenge a search because he was an overnight guest.  495 U.S. at 98-
100.  “Thus, an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may 
not.”  Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).   
The rule for which Rose argues is only slightly narrower than the “legitimately on 
[the] premises” standard that was rejected in Rakas.  Perhaps in the future, it may be 
necessary for us to decide whether Fourth Amendment rights attach somewhere on the 
spectrum between “overnight guest” and “merely present with the consent of the 
householder.”  We need not do so now, however, because, as ample precedent 
demonstrates, this case does not present a close call.  Rose had no possessory interest in 
any part of the apartment, United States v. Maddox, 944 F.2d 1223, 1234 (6th Cir. 1991); 
he did not store any clothing or property at the apartment, cf. United States v. Armenta, 
69 F.3d 304, 308-09 (9th Cir. 1995); he had no key to the apartment, cf. United States v. 
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Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Nabors, 761 F.2d 465, 469 
(8th Cir. 1985); he did not have permission to be at the apartment without Grayson’s 
presence or consent, cf. Davis, 932 F.2d at 757; Nabors, 761 F.2d at 469; he did not 
receive mail at the apartment, cf. Nabors, 761 F.2d at 469; five other guests had common 
access to the areas in the apartment occupied by him, cf. United States v. Ruiz, 664 F.3d 
833, 839 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Correa, 653 F.3d 187, 190-91 (3d Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Maestas, 639 F.3d 1032, 1039-40 (10th Cir. 2011); he had no ability to 
and made no effort to exclude others from any part of the apartment, cf. Gray, 491 F.3d at 
152; he was a casual acquaintance of Grayson’s, cf. Maddox, 944 F.2d at 1234; and, 
because no evidence was elicited at the suppression hearing suggesting that Rose had 
ever even visited Apartment 6 before the search, he was, it seems, an infrequent visitor to 
the apartment, cf. United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 647-48 (6th Cir. 2000); 
Maddox, 944 F.2d at 1234.  On this record, then, the District Court properly found that 
Rose lacked standing to challenge the search of Grayson’s apartment.3   
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Rose’s 
motion to suppress.   
                                              
3 Because we agree with the District Court that Rose lacks standing to challenge 
the search of Grayson’s apartment, we need not address his remaining arguments 
concerning the search.   
